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London’s burning: Assessing the impact  
of the 2014 fire station closures
What effect have fire station closures had on response times in central London? Benjamin M. Taylor investigates
In the face of ongoing austerity measures imposed by the British government, the consequences of 
cuts to public services are beginning 
to unfold. One of the most contentious 
decisions taken in 2014 related to the 
closure of 10 fire stations and the loss 
of 552 fire-fighters around the central 
London area. These measures were a 
result of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) 
being tasked with making savings of 
almost £29 million.
The affected stations were Belsize, 
Bow, Clerkenwell, Downham, 
Kingsland, Knightsbridge, Silvertown, 
Southwark, Westminster and Woolwich. 
These stations were selected for closure 
(presumably) so as to minimise any 
disruption to coverage and service 
in affected areas. Indeed, the LFB 
said at the time that services would 
not be impacted. The Fire Brigades 
Union (FBU), however, had a different 
perspective. Paul Embery, regional 
secretary of the FBU, said: “It will be 
only a matter of time before someone 
dies because a fire engine did not get to 
them in time” (bbc.in/1reZEb7).
To its credit, the LFB collects 
information on all call-outs – including 
the type of fire, date, time of day, spatial 
location and response time – which 
allows researchers to analyse the impact 
that station closures have had. In fact, 
in preparation for the closures, the Open 
Data Institute used this information to 
work out that average response times 
across London were likely to increase 
only marginally, from 5 min 34 s to 5 min 
37 s. However, in parts of the city directly 
affected by the station closures, the effect 
was expected to be more pronounced 
(london-fire.labs.theodi.org/).
Now, two years on, I have sought to 
bring some statistical rigour to these 
efforts and to map the response times 
at a more granular level, using data on 
dwelling fires only – as this type of fire 
accounts for over 80% of fire-related 
fatalities. Across the UK, there were 
39 600 dwelling fires in 2013–2014 
(bit.ly/1rf6yNu).
Areas at risk
London is divided into 33 districts – 32 
boroughs plus the City of London. The 
boroughs can be divided further into 
wards; however, my analysis sought 
to understand the effect of the station 
closures at the sub-ward level. 
Deciding which spatial areas may 
be at risk of increased response times 
following the closures is not just a 
question of producing maps of the 
raw data. The time an engine takes 
to respond to a call depends at what 
time of day and on which day of the 
week the fire occurs, as road traffic and 
staffing levels will vary accordingly. 
Response times also depend on the 
level of service provision in the vicinity 
– that is, the number of fire stations 
able to respond in a reasonable time 
to a call – and the demands on those 
stations being placed by other calls 
at the time of the fire, the effect of 
which might be that an engine has 
to be deployed from a station further 
out. There will, of course, be other 
influencing factors not measured by 
the available covariates.
The main aims of my analysis were 
to identify spatial regions that had 
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station closures and to determine if 
response times had changed in those 
areas. Response times are partially 
governed by the redeployment strategy 
adopted by the LFB which is constantly 
evolving, as can be seen in Figure 1.
Specifically, I looked for areas in 
which the response times (accounting 
for time of day, a weekend effect and 
the level of local service provision) 
seemed higher in 2014 and 2015 
compared with 2013 and 2012.
Figure 2 gives an idea of the size and 
location of regions potentially affected 
by the closures and how these have 
changed between 2014 and 2015. For 
residents living in the affected areas, 
the consequences of the closures could 
be serious. Following the closures, the 
LFB has only been able to respond to 
around 50% of calls in some of these 
regions (marked as red, blue or green) 
within its 6-minute target. Before the 
closures, there was no problem with 
response times at all.
Fire alarm
In my analysis, I assume a proportional 
hazards spatial survival model for the 
response times. While there may be 
other sensible modelling alternatives 
and methods for identifying potentially 
affected regions, my analyses indicate 
that the 2014 closures have had a 
negative impact on response times in 
the central London area.
To find out the substantive 
implications of these closures – that 
is, whether increased response times 
have led to more injuries and deaths, 
as the FBU suggested it would – it 
is necessary to link response time 
data to data from the ambulance 
service and from hospitals to follow 
up health outcomes as a result of 
fires, comparing the health outcomes 
of victims in 2012–2013 to those in 
2014–2015. Changes in the cost of 
damage to property resulting from fires 
could also be compared if the right 
data were available. 
Two years ago, the LFB declared 
publicly that services would not be 
affected by station closures. Two 
years on, the impact of the closures 
would seem to be more substantial 
than anticipated. n
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FIGURE 1 Maps of 
dwelling fire locations 
and deploying stations 
connected by coloured 
lines in 2013, 2014  
and 2015. Different 
colours are used to 
help distinguish the 
responses from each 
station. Solid markers 
are operational fire 
stations, hollow 
markers are the 
locations of the 10 
fire stations closed 
in 2014. These plots 
show how the London 
Fire Brigade has 
adjusted its response 
strategy in light of the 
closures; note that the 
strategy employed 
in 2015 is different 
from that employed 
in 2014. For example, 
consider Old Kent Road 
station, highlighted 
by an arrow. In 2014 
this station was 
responding mainly to 
fires to the east, but 
in 2015 responded in 
all directions, as it did 
in 2013
FIGURE 2 Areas 
where response times 
were higher in 2014, 
2015, and both 2014 
and 2015 than they 
were in 2012–2013, 
adjusting for time of 
day, a weekend effect 
and level of service 
provision. The bold line 
marks a 4 km buffer 
around the convex 
hull of the closed 
fire stations; we only 
consider differences 
in response times 
within this region in 
the present article. The 
results are presented 
on a 500 m by 500 m 
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